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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis illustrates forensic research work on Bitcoin, an innovative Internet 
based global transaction system that attracts ascending popularity during the recent 
few years. As an open, public and scalable distributed payment system, Bitcoin brings 
forward significant economic and technological impact to our world. Meanwhile, a new 
notion of virtual currency, “Bitcoin” comes into existence such that Bitcoin currency can 
be “mined” from all over world complying with specific algorithms. Mined bit “coins” 
has practical monetary values that turn the Bitcoin system into a digital currency 
circulation system. Due to Bitcoin’s decentralized semantics, Bitcoin transaction and 
currency are not subject to control and censorship from any single authority. Therefore, 
Bitcoin brings out various security concerns about its application as a long-term 
reliable system. 
The research in the thesis focuses on forensic study on Bitcoin. It covers 
experimental study on the Bitcoin network as a peer-to-peer system and a graph-based 
forensic approach against Bitcoin’s transaction data. Major contributions include 
network data evaluation and transaction history analysis. In case of forensic 
investigation is needed against criminal incidents such as fraud, false transactions and 
money theft, which are commonly seen in commonly used digital payment systems, the 
research provides a guidance of efficient information collection and framework of 
evidence data processing and extraction.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview – what is cryptographic currency and Bitcoin? 
Crypto currency (cryptographic currency) is a brand new concept that came into 
existence during recent years. It is a new type of digital currency capable of real world 
transaction activities like any other medium of exchange such as paper money in our 
everyday life. Unlike other types of digital money people are familiar with such as the 
PayPal balance and Online banking accounts, crypto currency runs as a decentralized 
transaction system with no authorized central management. For example, central servers 
from a specific commercial bank maintain an online banking system. The bank is 
responsible for all its customers’ account statements and transaction authenticity. Servers 
monitoring transaction behaviors would protect the database from malicious activities and 
network attacks. However, crypto currency is not subject to any such central servers as all 
the participants form a peer-to-peer (P2P) system without censorship. The security of such 
a system actually relies, as the name shows, on cryptographic algorithms instead of any 
man-made surveillance system. 
The idea of crypto currency systems first came out in the year of 2009 [1]. Bitcoin is 
the earliest crypto currency raised by the well-known Bitcoin whitepaper [2] with the 
pseudo name Satoshi Nakamoto as its author in 2009. The Bitcoin client software was soon 
practically implemented so that a P2P payment system was gradually formed as suggested 
in the whitepaper. Bitcoin has been the most popular and widely deployed crypto currency 
in the world after several years’ practical usage and development since 2009. The have 
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been other crypto currencies with very similar mechanism as Bitcoin after then, such as 
Litecoin, Namecoin, Altcoin, etc. But still Bitcoin is the most successful one in terms of 
monetary value, daily transaction amount and total number of users in the world. As a 
stereotype of crypto currency system, Bitcoin is worthy of intensive study both as a 
functioning distributed system and a secured transaction network. This is why the thesis is 
focused on the Bitcoin network data propagation and how this data affects system security. 
It is impossible to give accurate measure on how many Bitcoin users there are in the 
world due to the nature of P2P systems. Early in September 2011 there was estimation 
claiming that there were only 60,000 users at that point [3]. We believe this estimation is 
far from the true number because the estimation is not technically reliable, which is to be 
discussed in detail in the thesis. Moreover, the fact that Bitcoin users have been 
exponentially increasing during the past few years makes it even more difficult to estimate 
the user number in the whole system that covers the Internet. But there is other evidence 
showing the rapid exponential growth of Bitcoin users. As one of the Bitcoin wallet service 
website, Blockchain.info had 250,000 user wallets in June 2013 and this number went up to 
1,500,000 in May 2014 [4]. The number of user wallets is the number of Bitcoin users that 
benefit from the service of this website alone. There are a lot of other Bitcoin wallet service 
websites nowadays. For the rest of Bitcoin users who use the Bitcoin client they do not 
need any web wallet service because the software running on their own computers is 
responsible of fulfilling all the necessary computational processes. 
The content organization for the rest of the thesis follows such a guideline that it first 
introduces technical background related to Bitcoin including cryptographic premises, 
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digital signatures and data structures used. Next it comes to a brief description on how 
Bitcoin technically works and gives a high level view of the communication protocols 
between Bitcoin clients. Then it comes to objectives of the thesis consisting of two major 
parts of work. The first part is a set of in-depth experimental study on Bitcoin transaction 
propagation and network evaluations. The second part is a systematic approach of forensic 
investigation on Bitcoin block chain analysis and tracking currency flow. Finally comes the 
conclusion. 
1.2 Cryptography premises 
 
Despite that truth that the Bitcoin system is a cryptographic algorithm based 
transaction system, Bitcoin does not take care of data encryption. This means that in the 
Bitcoin protocol nothing is encrypted even though the currently applied Bitcoin client 
utilizes OpenSSL for data transmission but it is never part of the protocol design. Bitcoin 
benefits from two major applications of cryptographic, Hashing and Public Key 
Infrastructure. They are used in both transaction authentication and currency control, 
which form the basis of availability and security of the system. In the following context we 
introduce the concepts of crypto hash functions, public key infrastructure and digital 
signature one after the next.  
Hashing 
The hash function used in Bitcoin is the well-known hash function SHA-256 from the 
Secure Hash Algorithm family SHA-2 designed by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) 
in 2001. SHA-2 is also defined as the Secure Hash Standard in Federal Information 
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Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB 180-4) [5] for National Institution of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) in March 2012.  
SHA-256 is a widely deployed crypto hash functions right now in many security 
systems and encryption applications. SHA-256 function takes any size of string or number 
as its input, digests the input message and manipulates data to output a fixed size 
sequence. The SHA-256 is always a 256-bit binary value. 
SHA-256 has the basic properties that any other crypto hash functions are supposed to 
hold. First, SHA-256 calculation should be fast in computation complexity. Second, given a 
specific 512-bit SHA-256 output, it is computationally infeasible to calculate the input, 
which means SHA-256 is a strict one-way function. Moreover, it is very difficult to find two 
different inputs that generate the same hash output. These hash properties are concluded 
as the following list. 
 One-way function 
- Let s be the hash input (image) and function H, it is fast to compute y=H(s) 
 Pre-image Resistance 
- Given a hash y=H(s) only, it is very hard to compute image s 
 Second Pre-image Resistance 
- Given an image s, it is difficult to find s’ so that H(s)=H(s’) 
 Collision Resistance 
- It should be hard to find any two images S1 and S2 So that H(S1)=H(S2) 
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Example in Figure 1 illustrates the basic logics of SHA-256 function. Detailed SHA-256 
algorithm is not covered as it is off the research focus for the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
There is one other hash function called RIPEMD-160 used in Bitcoin implementation. 
RIPEMD-160 is a very old hash functions first published in 1996 [6]. It is used in Bitcoin 
system to generate shorter 160-bit outputs than SHA-256 hashes. RIPEMD-160 is rarely 
called other than used to generate part of Bitcoin public addresses. Therefore RIPEMD-160 
does not account for much importance in the Bitcoin system even though there already 
exist publicly known vulnerabilities in RIPEMD-160. 
Public key infrastructure 
Public-key encryption scheme, i.e. asymmetric cryptography is one of the most brilliant 
contributions in modern cryptography and more or less applied in vast majority of 
security-featured communication systems. The Bitcoin system adopts asymmetric 
cryptography for the sole purpose of creating digital signatures rather than data 
encryption. Instead of nowadays the most typical public key encryption algorithm RSA 
scheme, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is used in Bitcoin. ECDSA is a 
public key algorithm developed for NIST by the Accredited Standards Committee on 
Financial Services, X9 [7]. It is defined in FIPS PUB 186-3 Digital Signature Standard by 
SHA256() 
- Bit Appending 
- Message Digestion 
- Byte Concatenation 
ASCII 
“Input Sequence in 
Arbitrary Length” 
Hex 
b3c2dfe4c7f3fb07ff29cc9a1a
71c696e4e5b0e2927754ff85
d73758956b16c6 
Figure 1-1 
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NIST as part of standardized digital signature algorithm. The following section briefly 
describes how ECDSA is used. 
To generate an ECDSA signature, a set of domain parameters has to be predefined, as 
ECDSA is an elliptic curve based algorithm. Elliptic curve cryptography is about algorithms 
based on elliptic curves over finite fields and it is secured by intractability of related 
mathematic problems. Before running the ECDSA algorithm, parameters about the elliptic 
curve to use should be set as consensus between the signature sender and receiver. These 
include the elliptic curve’s equation that consists of two coefficients, the finite field size, a 
base point G on the curve and the integer order of n. To sign an ECDSA signature, one needs 
to generate a secret private key d which is an integer. A public key Q corresponding to d is 
calculated using Q=d×G which expresses point multiplication operation on an elliptic curve. 
Here the resulting Q is another point. The signature is generated from the curve and private 
key d and is a pair of scalars (r, s). To verify the signature, the receiver needs the signature 
(r, s), the elliptic curve G and the signer’s public key Q. Only the owner of private key d is 
able to generate a satisfactory signature that can be verified using Q. It is infeasible to brute 
force anyone’s private key from Q if d is always kept secret. Figure 1.2 illustrates how 
ECDSA is used in practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature Generation Curve Parameters 
Private Key Hash(Message) Signature(Message) 
Figure 1-2 
Curve Parameters 
Public Key Message Signature Verification 
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The hash function used in Bitcoin is SHA-256 for ECDSA signature generation and the 
choice of hash function here is not part of ECDSA standard. Mathematical details inside 
ECDSA signature generating and verification algorithm are not covered in the thesis. 
1.3 How Bitcoin works 
 
At present, the Bitcoin system consists of millions of Bitcoin client hosts all around the 
Internet. These users clients form the vast majority of the Bitcoin network and are treated 
as equivalent. As a purely decentralized network, the Bitcoin infrastructure has essential 
difference from other most commonly used P2P networks such as P2P based content 
delivery network (eDonkey, Bit torrent, etc.) for file sharing and P2P streaming protocols 
(P2P TV, P2P radio, etc.) for audio and video communication. This section gives a 
description on how Bitcoin as a distributed system works in network communication 
aspect that might differ from most online Bitcoin documentations. 
From the user side the Bitcoin is extremely simple to use. Downloading the Bitcoin 
client software is all that is needed. However, to realize a practical and universal 
transaction system, the Bitcoin needs to satisfy specific properties and well tackles several 
major problems. 
- Scalability 
The Bitcoin network allows for perfect scalability. It accommodates any number of 
user clients at any time. It is always free for new nodes to join the network and those in 
the network to exit whenever and as frequently as they want without affecting any 
transaction processes. 
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- Integrity, Malleability and Authenticity 
As the basic functional requirement for any valid transaction system, a user 
transaction has to be verified of its authenticity once it is made. It is never possible for 
anyone authorized to issue transactions for others into the Bitcoin network. Also 
transaction forgery and malicious modification against legal transactions are avoided. 
All Bitcoin transaction records are guarded against Malleability. 
 
-  Immunity against Replay Attacks 
In traditional digital transaction systems there are always carefully designed 
countermeasures against replay attacks. For example, the same network request of 
paying 100$ from one’s PayPal account cannot be sent twice to make another payment 
of 100$ from that account, in case the request is intercepted by an attacker. In Bitcoin, 
no central security server is available to trace replay attacks but such attacks are well 
prevented by protocol logics. We always use the term “Double Spending” for acts 
similar to replay attacks in Bitcoin context. 
 
- System Availability and Performance 
Every time we mention availability of a P2P network, we mostly refer to its 
performance and its resistance to possible DoS attacks. The Bitcoin system right now 
has pretty high network response and full availability that is satisfactory in capacity for 
the current user basis. Bitcoin client software has been updated all the time and is 
already carefully coded to guard against almost all the possible DoS attacks people are 
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now thinking about, even though new types of DoS attacks will attempt to bring down 
the system availability in future when new updates will be required for the program. 
The technique 
The essential idea of Bitcoin is built upon the concept of the block chain. The block 
chain can be understood as the unique database that consists of all the transaction records 
from the birth of Bitcoin up till now. To participate into transaction activities, all the nodes 
are mandatorily required to synchronize with the network, which means that everyone 
needs to download and maintain the latest version of transaction record database, the 
“block chain”, to get themselves notified on what has been going on. For new coming users 
who do not have any transaction data or those who do not hold the latest transaction data 
due to absence from the network for a long time, they have to get the block chain copy from 
other peers who already have it. When each new transaction is generated, this transaction 
has to be broadcast onto the global Bitcoin network to inform as many others as possible so 
that the transaction is confirmed and accepted by the network if it is valid. Failure 
completing this job makes this transaction expire.  
To more clearly illustrate the technique, let us look at a simplified and idealized 
scenario. The Bitcoin network is analogous to a large group people involved in real-time 
transactions. Every time one issues a valid transaction, he/she has to “yell out” that 
payment for the whole group to hear about it. Suppose most group members will hear and 
record this transaction to update their block chain. For those who did not hear this 
payment they periodically ask people nearby to quickly query transaction updates. The 
purpose of broadcasting is to make sure everyone has a complete history record from the 
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beginning so that they are able to verify if it is legitimate for someone to issue certain 
transaction. 
1.4 Incentives of Bitcoin 
 
The rise of Bitcoin and its continuing popularity come with various reasons. The major 
advantage is that Bitcoin is far more than private money and mere medium of exchange. 
Bitcoin is a self-supplying financial system with much more flexibility than traditional 
online payment systems.  
For end-users primary reasons of using Bitcoin in everything life include both security 
and cost considerations. The most attractive point of Bitcoin is that its money is issued by 
coin miners around the world and is not subject to central authorized management. The 
money of Bitcoin is more like gold than any government issued paper currency due to its 
distributed nature so that a person’s coins can never be forfeit or voided unless one’s 
Bitcoin wallet data is no longer kept secure. The second reason is Bitcoin’s decent 
transaction anonymity. Bitcoin has privacy-oriented nature and transaction history alone 
does not reveal user identity despite that all the transactions are broadcast onto the 
Internet. Pure Bitcoin activities never bond real-world financial authentication such as 
bank accounts. Other than the above, the average transaction fee of Bitcoin is lower than 
traditional online approaches like bank transfer or PayPal because it is an adjustable tip 
paid to Bitcoin miners around the world. How transaction fee is handled will be technically 
illustrated in later chapters. 
Merchants can also benefit from accepting Bitcoin for goods. First Bitcoin transactions 
are irreversible after commitment, compared with credit card or PayPal payments that can 
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be charged back even after a long time of completing a transaction. Next making Bitcoin 
payment is a user friendly and easy process without exchange rate between currencies of 
nations, because Bitcoin is globally circulated and unified. This potentially increases selling 
and net profit. 
Lastly, Bitcoin currency attracts real capital as Bitcoin potentially makes fortune if 
properly invested. As Bitcoin price is mostly determined by the rate of coin mining and its 
popularity, its value fluctuates at times. Other than direct coin mining, Bitcoin selling is an 
essential approach for profits for many Bitcoin investors.  
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CHAPTER 2 
A HIGH-LEVEL VIEW OF BITCOIN SYSTEM AND PROTOCOLS THEREOF 
 
This chapter covers a high level view on the Bitcoin transaction protocol without 
discussing too much low level details, whereas two major parts are introduced, the block 
chain data structure and transaction data processing. The majority of the chapter attempts 
to briefly summarize the fundamental design pattern first brought forward by the famous 
Bitcoin whitepaper [8] and illustrate how such design cryptographically achieves most of 
the functional requirements specified in Section 1.3. Then this chapter also talks about 
how privacy is protected through anonymity of Bitcoin, or actually more strictly speaking, 
pseudo-anonymity. 
The simplified broadcasting scheme is almost impossible to realize in typical 
distributed systems and even if were it would not address any security-related problems 
either. Therefore special data structures and crypto logics have to be adopted.  
 
Figure 2-1 is a diagram about a block chain episode. The block chain is a long tree-
based data structure that consists of large sequence of blocks. The figure shows two 
consecutive blocks on the chain with sequence number n and n+1. A real Bitcoin block 
contains tons of details about the block origination, transaction information and lots of 
other trivial data fields. For the interest of high-level logics, we focus on the several fields 
drawn in Figure 2-1 at this moment.  
Figure 2-1 Block Chain Conceptual Diagram 
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The “Prev Hash” field in every block is a hash value of the previous block. Here the 
hash refers to twice SHA-256 applied on the previous block. The doubly applied output is 
stored as a fixed-size field in the current as the case in Figure 2-1. The “Tx Related Info” is 
a description on transactions in the current block but it is NOT simply a plain record of 
transactions. 
2.1 Bitcoin mining and proof-of-work 
Bitcoin mining is perhaps the most popular term in Bitcoin technology and 
economics community. Bitcoin mining is the process of generating a block on the basis of 
the current block chain. Suppose the current block chain has length of n, meaning that the 
latest block is block n. Suppose someone intends to generate a new block based upon 
block n, he/she takes block n and calculates the hash (always double SHA-256) of block n. 
The hash is stored as the “Prev Hash” field in the block to be mined (block n+1). To mine is 
to determine the nonce value in block n+1, the miner has to brute force attempt as many 
possible nonce values as possible until such a nonce is fetched that makes the hash of 
block n+1 below specific threshold. Once the miner succeeds, he/she has to broadcast the 
newly generated block n+1. The rest of the network verifies the satisfactory hash value, 
accepts it and update the block chain. As SHA-256 is a well secure hash function, it is 
difficult to tell what the nonce value it is to hash the block below the threshold. Therefore 
mining is always an extremely computation intensive brute force cracking process to 
reverse the double SHA-256 algorithm. There is no shortcut unless SHA-256 is no longer 
secure. This ordered block mining logic is in Bitcoin terminology called “Proof-of-Work”. 
Next we answer questions how to put such logic into practical network. 
- What is the motivation of Bitcoin mining 
       14 
Mining blocks is mining Bitcoin, thus mining money. As part of Bitcoin essential 
protocol, a miner gets specific amount of “coins” as reward for each block he/she 
mines. The reward is implemented in the way that a miner is allowed to write the 
reward for himself/herself to claim as transaction information in the block mined. This 
means every block has the identification information on who the miner is and we 
usually call it “block owner”. 
- Controlled Currency Supply 
The threshold that restricts the block hash outputs is called “difficulty” of Bitcoin 
mining. It is not a constant. Bitcoin protocol requires that mining difficulty increase 
after every 2016 blocks. We call the block hash threshold “target” in Bitcoin context. To 
make the difficulty increase, the target is lowered so as to force miners to calculate 
smaller outputs as time passes. However, in rare cases the difficulty can be reduced 
and the change depends on the time it takes to find the recent 2016 block. There are 
currently more than 300,000 blocks in the block chain and the average time interval 
between any two consecutive blocks generation is 9.35 minutes [9] based on 
Blockchain Stats. As each block keeps a time stamp on its generation, anyone who 
possesses the current block chain should be able to compute it. It is a global indication 
on how much effort miners in this world investing in mining. Therefore 2016 blocks 
roughly takes 2 weeks to spawn, with random deviation. If the time to get the last 2016 
blocks is over 2 weeks, which is mostly the practical case right now, the difficulty is 
raised; otherwise reduced, which is rarely seen up till today. 
Apart from the difficulty change, the mining reward gets halved every 210,000 
blocks. The Bitcoin protocol initially rewards each miner 50 BTC (unit for amount of 
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one “coin”) and it is now 25 BTC per block, as it is in the second 210,000-block phase. 
That is, from the 420,001th block on, mining reward goes to 12.5 BTC and so on. 
Obviously this geometric decreasing pattern makes the reward zero at the end so that 
total number of possible Bitcoin currency amount converges at 21 million BTC [10]. 
This value can either be referenced from online documents or very quickly verified 
using geometric sequence summing equations.  
Bitcoin, from a non-technical point of view, is not only a transaction agency, but 
also a sophisticated economic system.  The purpose of both difficulty increasing and 
reward reduction comes from the demand of controlled currency supply, which is 
fundamental requirement for any economic system to healthily function in the long 
run. Without controlled supply, a currency suffers rapid inflation that eventually 
brings down the ecology of coin circulation. 
- How to deal with chain forks 
“Chain fork” is a severe problem and probably the most challenging security 
concern in the Bitcoin system because it directly enables the possibility of double 
spending attacks. Chain forks result from either in-purpose attacks or natural reasons  
such presence of long network latency. A chain fork is defined as when a block has two 
or more valid successor blocks with valid nonces. The multiple successors can hash to 
complete different outputs but all are below the specific current “target”. 
Figure 2-2 Chain Fork Example 
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Figure 2-2 is the forking case extending from Figure 2-1. Note that in this diagram 
both Nonce 1 and Nonce 2 are valid and both blocks should be accepted into the 
network according to the protocol.  
There is previous work of dedicated analysis on how chain forks quantitatively 
emerge depending on how much network latency there is [11]. Observation in the 
work showed that 169 out of 10000 blocks between block height 180,000 and 190,000 
are forked; their theoretical model calculates the forking probability of a block at 
1.78% close to the observed value of 1.69%. This is not a negligible probability so the 
block chain is required to well accommodate forking. The proof-of-work protocol 
further demands that only the longest fork of chain survive. If there are multiple 
miners mining from different block chains, the growing rate of each block chains 
purely depends on the computing power devoted on each chain. The author of the 
original Bitcoin whitepaper pointed out that one chain will soon wins out against the 
others and once other mines find it out, they will all switch to the longest and fastest 
growing chain, in absence of double spending attack, because mining the longest chain 
ensures the highest rate of reward and best efficient usage of computing power for 
honest miners. 
The motivation of complying with the longest chain does not always apply with 
double spending attackers. The poof-of-work is designed with natural expectation on 
attackers deliberately forking the block chain. As the most fundamental stereotype of 
double spending, an attacker mines on alternative chain forks other than the longest 
one that contains transaction he made. If he manages to win against the valid chain by 
generating a longer fork chain than the current, he reverts the payment he sent before. 
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Typically such brute force forking requires immense computing power beyond 
imagination and practice. Satoshi Nakamoto proposes that as long as the majority of 
miners all over the Internet are honest miners, attackers can never succeed in 
competing with the rest of the world unless he were to be able to dominate the world’s 
computing resource more than 50%, which is the very reason such double spending 
attack is termed 51% attacks in Bitcoin context. 
There is a lot of previous research focused on feasibility of 51% attacks while all 
are about purely theoretical analysis model. The paper studying hash-rate based 
attacks (equivalent to brute force attack) [12] creates a negative binomial model to 
describe the generation of each new block with bias to favor either the attacker or the 
honesty network. Theory reveals that reverting more than 10 blocks on the valid 
chains is close impossible even by assuming the attacker possesses an improbable 
10% of the network’s computing power.  
Real Bitcoin network has major deviation in the sense of block generating 
processes for two reasons. First SHA-256 does not give truly uniformly random 
outputs so the probability model is hard to precisely depict. Second computing power 
on the network is an abstract concept that cannot be statistically categorized. For 
example, a million simultaneous miners do not make equivalent contribution as one 
million times a single miner makes. So it is not practically accurate to say an attacker 
holding 51% computing resource ensures double spending success. But 51% has been 
used in terminology and we abide by the convention. 
- Whether chain forks affect user transactions 
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It is a pretty common user-concerning question whether user transactions 
behavior is restricted in the presence of chain forks. The answer is definite not. A user 
transaction will not be a problem so long as this transaction is written into block on all 
the currently existing chains. The next section covers transaction processes and 
further illustrates this point. 
2.2 Transaction generation and verification 
The block chain manipulates everything about currency generation and takes on 
the functionality of transaction database shared by all nodes running the Bitcoin client. 
The second portion of Bitcoin protocol’s capstone design is transaction circulation 
scheme. Despite the intuition people might have from what the name “Bitcoin” implies, 
there is no reified representation on “coins” in the block chain. It also means Bitcoin 
never records user’s account balance as a typical online banking system would do. 
Currency circulation is purely controlled by transaction histories. The Bitcoin software 
verifies user balance by scanning relevant user transaction records available on the 
block chain and calculating the net transaction output. Below is explanation how 
transactions are logically linked with each other. 
 
Figure 2-3 Transaction Logic from Satoshi’s Whitepaper 
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Figure 2-3 is the same figure from the original whitepaper that designs transaction 
generation and verification process using digital signature. Every time one spends Bitcoin, 
he/she has to take previous transactions which are payment from others as the input, 
include the public key belonging to the payee and signs this transaction with his/her 
private key. The payee is able to quickly verify if that payment is made to the correct 
receiver with the payer’s public key. In Figure 2-3, Owner 2 is paying Bitcoin to Owner 3 
so he takes the transaction paid to him from Owner 1, includes Owner 3’s public key and 
signs the transaction. Owner 3 checks if the transaction has the correct signature and if it 
does it means Owner 2 has made the payment. Owner 3 can use this payment as input paid 
to others later on.  
Figure 2-3 is merely a conceptual diagram and practical Bitcoin transaction 
implementation differs a lot and is far more complicated that what is covered above. As 
two most functional features of currency, payment has to be dividable and change has to 
be supported like real money. Real-life Bitcoin realizes payment division by allowing 
multiple transaction inputs; and change by multiple transaction outputs in a single 
transaction.  
 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Simple Transaction Structure 
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Figure 2-4 is what Bitcoin typically does to craft a specific transaction. A user may 
combine multiple smaller transactions to send a larger amount of money. In case no 
satisfactory combination can be constructed from previous transactions, for example, in 
case sum of the 4 inputs exceeds the desire amount of payment, the user sets up multiple 
outputs. Here output 0 is signed as a payment to the payee and output 1 is signed as 
payment to himself. Consequently output 1 is the change to the user during this single 
transaction. 
The digital signature based transaction scheme is resistant to transaction forgery 
and money theft, ensuring transaction integrity and authentication. Also the ECDSA 
signature used in Bitcoin is has nice cryptographic property against malleability.  
2.3 Transaction confirmation and genesis block 
Section 2.1 illustrates that the Bitcoin protocol maintains the block chain to allow for 
large-scale data synchronization and high scalability for Bitcoin as a distributed system. 
Section 2.2 summarizes the transaction circulation logic raised in the original Bitcoin 
whitepaper and shows that Bitcoin as a transaction system has its integrity and 
authentication scheme achieved by digital signature. Low level details into the block chain 
and transactions are covered in the next chapter dipping into system performance and 
hazard mitigation. This section covers two problems derived from the Bitcoin protocol 
discussed so far, the concept of confirmation and genesis block. 
Transaction Confirmation  
Transaction Confirmation is a precisely defined term in Bitcoin.  
Definition Bitcoin transaction is said to be confirmed if a transaction has been written onto the 
major block chain.  
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 It is mentioned in Section 1.3 that every single transaction is broadcast for the 
network to accept. A Bitcoin client user issues a transaction and waits for the transaction 
to be confirmed, or to appear in the block chain. It is not specified by the protocol how the 
transaction is written onto the block chain. Right now, Bitcoin miners around the world 
handle transaction confirmation as part of their jobs. Every time miners succeed finding a 
new block, they include the transactions they hear about from the network into the new 
block and broadcast this block. The first transaction in newly mined block is always the 
transaction that rewards the miner, as mentioned in Section 1.3. This transaction is called 
generation transaction and it simply stands for creation of currency instead of payment 
received from others. 
Definition Bitcoin transaction confirmation number of a transaction is the inclusive count of 
blocks starting from the block this transaction is in. 
The purpose to introduce the definition of confirmation number is for practical 
transaction safety. Section 2.1 demonstrates the occurrence of chain forks and how it 
relates to double spending attack. The fact that a transaction is confirmed does not 
guarantee that the payee safely receives the payment. A confirmed transaction can be 
reverted by blocks on alternative chain forks. The common practice against such hazard 
right now is to wait for certain confirmation number on a transaction. Meni Rosenfeld’s 
[13] negative binomial model shows that reverting a block is probabilistically impractical 
when the block has 5 or more blocks appended after it. Even with brute force attack, it is 
highly unlikely to revert 6 blocks on the main chain against the honest network. 
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Figure 2-5 describes two different cases for the same transaction. The risk in gets 
block n much lower due to the existence of block n+1 to n+5 because the attacker has to 
regenerate 6 alternative block n to block n+5 to revert the main chain. 
In case of naturally occurring chain forks, the payee should be aware of transaction 
confirmation on both chain forks because it is ready to tell which fork  
 
eventually wins out in a short period of time. As in Figure 2-5, the transaction Tx is 
expected to get confirmed in both Block n and Block n’. In this way the payee would get the 
payment regardless of which of the two forks wins out in the end. Otherwise, Tx should 
not be considered a valid payment. 
Genesis Block 
Genesis block is the first block (Block 0) of the block chain. There is only one genesis 
block on a block chain thus for each specific crypto currency. The genesis block is set up 
Figure 2-5 Chain Fork vs. Risk 
Figure 2-6 Confirmations on Forks 
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solely to start up Bitcoin and mining. It has different data format than all the subsequent 
blocks. The generation transaction in the genesis block is not spendable. The Unix time 
stamp field in this block has the value 1231006505 standing for the date Sat, 03 Jan 2009 
18:15:05 GMT which is the time when Bitcoin first came out and practically started to 
function. 
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CHAPTER 3  
OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of the thesis are experiment findings and answers to a set of different 
questions that can be helpful to Bitcoin forensic techniques and related research areas. 
3.1 Practical motivation 
It has been several years since Bitcoin first came out in 2009. Although it is well 
functioning as a valid and reliable transaction system there have still been several issues 
about Bitcoin as money. The first problem is money theft and fraudulent transactions. Due 
to Bitcoin’s irreversible nature, refunding is not possible after a transaction without the 
payee’s approval. In case of money theft or loss it is most probable that the owner does not 
any knowledge of what happened to the coin, because users are only identified by 
anonymous Bitcoin addresses. Distinguishing raw transactions is often difficult. The most 
influencing Bitcoin theft incident just occurred this year where the once largest Bitcoin 
market provider Mt. Gox sustained a huge loss and filed bankruptcy. Conspiracy of the 
case is still undergoing police investigation and no conclusive answers are given yet.  
The second problem is illegal activities involving Bitcoin. Bitcoin is an ideal 
currency for black market transactions of illegitimate goods like drugs. It is not feasible to 
answer what a specific Bitcoin transaction is used for and who made that transaction.  
As a most well-known Bitcoin drug market, Silk Road [14] was first launched in 2011 
and soon gained nearly one million of registered users accounts, which was far below the 
number of actual users. Approximately 10 million Bitcoins (BTC) circulated through Silk 
Road before it was seized by FBI in September, 2013 but it was re-launched two months 
later [15].  
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To help with forensic work against illegal Bitcoin actions, the thesis researches a 
framework of evidence retrieving and analysis, in case criminal incidents occur and 
demand that investigators need to know what are transaction relations between different 
Bitcoin users or user groups and where the coins ended up in.  
3.2 Research contents 
The thesis first carries out empirical study on Bitcoin transaction synchronization 
problems. A series of experiments were set up to discover impacting factors that affect 
how transactions are delivered and synchronized onto the Bitcoin network. Throughout 
these real network based experiments, the following questions are answered. 
 In what way are Bitcoin transactions relayed by various nodes and propagated 
through the network? 
 How does the Bitcoin network ensure its efficiency and accuracy in broadcasting 
information to all its participants?  
 Whether the Bitcoin system is subject to particular Network topology, so that not 
all participants have a fair chance to hear transaction information and have their 
transactions confirmed? 
 What role does transaction fee play in practical Bitcoin usage? Does transaction 
fee always help a transaction get confirmed sooner? 
The second area of research is focused on forensics. Bitcoin as a real-world currency 
circulation system has been involved into various criminal cases during the last few years. 
One much demanding technique to investigate Bitcoin incidents is to track the currency 
flow. Due to anonymity property of Bitcoin addresses, it is difficult to determine where a 
specific sum of money goes. This thesis creates a data model to rearrange Bitcoin 
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addresses and utilize a graph based algorithm to track money flow. Briefly, it answers the 
following questions. 
 Given the block chain data, how do we extract transactions and determine what 
addresses should belong to the same Bitcoin entity? 
 How to turn the block chain data into graphs that reflect single transactions 
between different Bitcoin entities? 
 What algorithm can be used to traverse the graph so that we discover where a 
money flow goes 
The next two chapters of the thesis covers each of the above research areas and all 
these questions will be discussed in detail or by experiment outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 4  
GUIDANCE ON BITCOIN EVIDENCE COLLECTION 
 
Bitcoin has been evolving into a vast peer-to-peer network system with magnificent 
amount of traffic going on and rapidly increasing computing resource invested. As an ever 
fast growing distributed system the Bitcoin network behavior is actually far more 
complicated than it was assumed to be. This chapter studies network topology and show 
empirical results about how information propagation in Bitcoin system can possibly be 
affected subject to current protocols and many programming level details. The significance 
of empirical study comes from the technical aspect that how information is delivered over 
the network in many ways affects end-user security and the whole system’s resilience to 
malicious activities, as Bitcoin does not purely consists of end-user clients and not all 
participants are considered equivalent despite Bitcoin’s completely decentralized 
semantics when it was initially devised in 2009. Experiment outcomes in this chapter 
reveal some insights that information synchronization is subject to specific Bitcoin nodes 
on the network. Characteristics found can provide some guidance to efficient data 
extraction in need of detailed forensic investigation. 
4.1 Principles of experiments 
Bitcoin is a large-scale transaction system based on peer-to-peer (p2p) network and 
cryptographic algorithm. Current Bitcoin system is an open and practically working 
economy system that redefines the flow of digital currency and involves increasing 
amount of real world transactions every day. Apart from basic functional requirements on 
any typical transaction system such as identity authentication and transaction integrity, 
Bitcoin network working as a decentralized distributed system is responsible for 
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processing all transaction related computations under various constraints. Due to the 
nature of Bitcoin protocol that was initially devised in 2009 [16] it is required for every 
participant in the network first to get their database well synchronized to the network in 
order to carry out any subsequence activities. This imposes performance requirement that 
achievable synchronization and efficient multicasting is expected from the network. This 
paper illustrates sets of experiments observing how different nodes in the Bitcoin system 
get organized and in what way information propagation works. Experimental Analysis 
based upon the current Bitcoin client would be sequentially described followed by 
discussion that leads to possible security concern. We also make hypothesis from those 
empirical results so as to consider the feasibility of using Bitcoin as a reliable transaction 
system and a scalable distributed system in both short run and long run sense.  
The major motivation to focus the study particularly on network synchronization 
comes from Bitcoin’s security reliance on data consistency at each node. There is previous 
analysis by Christian Decker and Roger Wattenhofer [17] depicting a model that showed 
network inconsistency caused by network failure or longer latency increases potential 
vulnerability to malicious activities. One other reason is that information propagation is 
pretty sensitive to protocols adopted by every single participant in p2p systems. Ideally 
such a synchronized system exhibits perfect behavior whenever a new message comes out 
from arbitrary source node. The new message is expected to reach every other node in 
participation in a negligible time interval in analogy to global broadcasting. Practically, 
complicated Internet environment makes the whole system far from perfect consistency. 
Therefore it is a worthy-of-discussion topic to study how Bitcoin actually sustains current 
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Internet environment and whether experimental results in this paper indicate any existing 
or future tendency in terms of end user financial security. 
The experimental study consists mostly of observations and discussion. Different sets 
of experiments will be illustrated throughout the context. It intends to show major 
findings regarding two aspects. First, the Bitcoin network topology tends to rely more on 
specific groups of nodes subject to node discovery methods. Second, it illustrates that 
transaction confirmation is a complicated process that involves some randomness. For 
end users, transaction fees do not always pay them off. 
4.2 Experimental setup 
Experiment study is partitioned into two major sets. The first set focuses on Bitcoin 
client network communication behavior and attempts to explain what it implies about 
some features to network topology. Two problems are primarily concerned in this 
observation. How do Bitcoin clients find each other? How perfect data synchronization is 
achieved? Bitcoin clients are right now programmed with two ways of node discovery. The 
client is hardcoded with a list of fixed hostnames of specific DNS servers called “DNS 
seeds”. The list can be subject to change when a newer version of Bitcoin software comes 
out but stays hardcode for the same version. Querying these DNS seeds replies a list of 
publicly routable IP addresses referring to other nodes running the Bitcoin client.  
All Bitcoin communication between nodes is via Bitcoin messages that can be 
considered as the application protocol in Bitcoin system. The other node discovery 
technique is through node address broadcasting messages. It is the process of requesting 
IPs of other nodes from the nodes one is already connected with. Sending a “getaddr” 
message to your connected peer nodes requests peers to reply with an “addr” message 
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containing a list of other nodes’ addresses. The addresses fetched by a client are stored in 
a local file “peer.dat” for future reference to select random IPs from when handling 
“getaddr” requests from others. There is one important detail of using “addr” for public IP 
broadcasting. Every 24 hours, a client broadcasts its current public IP address through 
“addr” message to its connected nodes, to notify the network of existence of itself [18]. 
Data transmission in Bitcoin is similar to gossip based approach but still implemented 
in messages. Transactions and blocks in Bitcoin are broadcast in the same way on the 
network. Both of the two types of data transmission starts with an “inv” message used to 
advertise what new block/transaction one has heard. Peers may ignore “inv” if it has the 
advertised transaction/block or if not it replies with “getdata”/”getblock” message to 
request that transaction/block. 
There are default connection limits regulated by each standard client. Each Bitcoin 
node requests a maximum of 8 outbound connections to others and a maximum number of 
125 total connections including inbound and outbound connections. For most clients that 
run behind NAT their connection number will never exceed 8 given the NAT router is not 
specially configured to forward Bitcoin application port number, as these clients cannot 
accept any inbound TCP connection necessary for relaying Bitcoin messages. Such 
connection limits reveal some critical features regarding the network topology. As each 
message can be multicast only to a limited number of nodes, information propagation 
becomes sensitive to latency. Due to lack of central coordinator, it is a theoretically correct 
assumption that some nodes might experience difficulty keeping them informed of most 
up-to-date block and transaction information in time. However, the first set of 
experiments show that such an issue rarely occurs in real environment.  
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The second set of experiments seeks for patterns in which transactions are 
confirmed. Bitcoin transaction is instantly generated and issued, but transaction 
confirmation is not. A user always has to wait for one transaction to be confirmed by some 
miner before this transaction can be considered valid and successful. The best optimal 
estimation of time taken to confirm a transaction is simply the time interval from 
transaction generation to the next block coming out. Up to the recent block 327,000 on the 
block chain, the average time interval between two subsequent blocks is roughly 11.52 
minutes [19]. It is reasonable to expect to see a transaction appear on the block chain 
within the 11.52 minutes however much longer confirmation time is still commonly seen 
because for monetary purpose most miners confirm transactions in order based on 
transaction fee, which is a key factor that determines how fast a transaction is confirmed. 
Transaction fee is a concept as part of Bitcoin core protocol and it enhances 
economic motivation for more miners to contribute to currency generation and 
transaction confirmation. A payer indicates transaction fee amount in a transaction as 
extra fee paid to whoever helps confirm this single transaction. The miner permanently 
claims the amount of fee in the transaction he confirms and this fee can also be 0 for some 
transactions. A common practice of recent miners is to first sort unconfirmed transactions 
by the fee indicated then confirms those with larger amount of fee with higher priority. 
For most end users, paying a higher transaction fee raises their expectation to have the 
transaction confirmed sooner. However, confirmation time vs. transaction fees does not 
abide by simple monotonic pattern, as there are factors that affect how a transaction is 
relayed before it reaches specific miner. 
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The experimental observation also helps find out an approximate pattern how fast 
transactions get confirmed with different ranges of transaction fee and model the trade-off 
between the fee amount and confirmation promptness, from the real block chain statistics 
within the recent 20 months. 
4.3 Experiments and analysis 
4.3.1 Network Investigation 
Experiment set A consists of two experiments mainly on network environment study.  
1) Experiment 1 – DNS seeds 
DNS seed servers in Bitcoin function as small IP databases and are maintained by 
volunteers. Those seed servers are no more than other ordinary DNS servers on the 
Internet and they only provide IPs of Bitcoin users but never run anything about Bitcoin 
themselves. The IPs provided by seed servers have significant impact on how Bitcoin 
clients discover other nodes, especially for the first time a Bitcoin client runs because it 
has not yet kept any peer node’s IP in history. The client has to query one or more DNS 
seeds for the first list of IPs to get engaged into the Bitcoin system. 
DNS seeds are always hardcoded in Bitcoin client program. But the list of DNS hosts 
do not always remain fixed, neither do the IP addresses answered from them. During the 
investigation period of this paper, DNS seeds hardcoded in the clients within 3 months 
increased from 4 to 7 servers as shown by the standard client “bitcoind” source code [20].  
Experiment 1 did exhaustive search by repeating DNS requests for a long time to the 
DNS seeds trying to get a maximum number of possible unique resolved IPs. We launched 
a customized program to handle DNS requests and collected all unique IPs. The process 
kept running for a long time until the total number of unique IPs from those servers hardly 
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increase. The whole list of IPs is then sorted by relative frequencies (proportion to the 
total address count) in the list. The experiment was repeated every 2 months for 3 times. 
The following 3 datasets display the results from trial in each time. 
 
# Data Set 1 2 3 
Total # 
Unique IP 
6187 10191 5928 
Highest 
Frequency 
0.0079 0.0062 0.0068 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Data Set 3 - Address Distribution 3 
 
The above three data sets refer to different IP lists resolved by the DNS seed servers. 
Even if the IP list from DNS seeds vary a lot, the distribution is relatively stable and far 
from uniform. This also implies the fact that some nodes in the DNS seed IP list are 
queried with far higher probability than the rest.  
Figure 4-2 Data Set 2 - Address Distribution 2 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Data Set 1 - Address Distribution 1 
 
Table 4-1 #IPs in DNS Seed Lists 
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Hypothesis may be inferred that during specific period of time during which IP lists 
from DNS seeds remain relatively stable, there are a small set of nodes that are much more 
active than others on Bitcoin network. This node set can result in a more compact core 
than the rest of network topology.  
 
2) Experiment 2 – Peer Discovery 
The node address distribution outcome in Experiment 1 is not yet a direct reflection 
on the probability which node to connect to during the runtime. The standard client 
adopts a complicated technique to randomize as much as possible the choice of peers 
regardless of some preference to previously connected IPs that worked before. Nodes that 
were previously connected to are saved in the file “peer.dat” for future reference. 
Experiment 2 consists of 3 steps to model the practical situation described above. For 
the first part, we deleted “peer.dat” so as to make Bitcoin software rebuild an empty 
profile. The client process was killed and restarted every 10 minutes for more than 100 
times. We modified the client source code so that every time new addresses are written to 
“peer.dat” those addresses are also dumped into separate files for us to collect.  
# Attempt 1 2 3 4 
# IPs from seed 141 252 141 23 
# total IPs 480 930 570 75 
Seed nodes/total 
ratio 
0.294 0.271 0.247 0.306 
 
Table 4-2 shows that a pretty stable proportion (around 30%) of IP addresses from 
DNS seeds are cached at local. That is to say these addresses are what have been cached 
into peer.dat.  
Table 4-2 Addresses in Local Cache 
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The second step makes statistics on the other information source of “peer.dat”, the 
“addr” messages from other nodes. Addresses relayed by “addr” are periodically dumped 
into this file. Within a 24-hour period, we collected all the “addr” messages that were 
heard and examined each single unique IP. The main reason to stay for 24 hours is to 
allow for every online node to broadcast its own IP for at least once, according to the rule 
mentioned in Section 4.2.  
Total # unique 
addresses 
Addresses from 
DNS seeds 
Ratio seed 
nodes/ total 
20005 1249 0.0624 
 
In the last step, we simply saved a list of all nodes that were actually connected during 
the past 24 hours. 
Total # unique 
nodes connected 
Addresses from 
DNS seeds 
Ratio seed 
nodes/ total 
154 13 0.0844 
 
Table 4-4 is a real use case description. It shows that 8.4% of connected nodes come 
from DNS seeds given a client program stays online for a long time. 
4.3.2 Transaction synchronization 
Experiment set B includes 4 experiments studying how transactions get propagated 
and confirmed. Experiment 1 and 2 both focus on the frequency of nodes from seed 
servers and how active they are. Starting from Experiment 3, we investigate their property 
and real functionality.  
1) Experiment 3 – Transaction Arrival Test 
Experiment 3 relies on the well-known third-party Bitcoin wallet service website 
blockchain.info which supports various API requests about detailed block chain data. The 
Table 4-3 Addresses in “addr” Message 
 
Table 4-4 Addresses Actually Connected 
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experiment first started the Bitcoin client and only connected to one node IP of choice. 
This was to force the connected node to be the only information source for our client to 
synchronize with the network. Within 2 hours period, we recorded every single 
unconfirmed transaction heard from this node, attached with a time stamp on the moment 
we received it.  
Next we queried blockchain.info transaction database with each single transaction 
we collected for their arrival time on the server. blockchain.info also keeps a time stamp 
when a transaction reaches their server. Our initial assumption on this experiment is that 
due to low connectivity our client would have most transactions arrival lagged in time, 
compared to the blockchain.info server which maintains hundreds of connections all the 
time that far exceeds the connection limits for end user clients. 
Experiment 3 was in parallel to Experiment 1 and also depends on IP list from DNS 
seeds. It was first done at the same time Data Set in Figure 1-1 and was repeated after two 
months when seed IP list changed to Figure 4-2.  
Test Node 1 2 3 4 
Total # Transactions 
Collected 
5354 5194 5906 7600 
Frequency in DNS 
Seed List 
0.007
9 
0.004
6 
0.001
9 
0.000
3 
Average Latency 
with Server 
-7.9s 1.46s -17.4s -5s 
 
Table 4-5 illustrates the average latency calculated over all the collected transactions 
from 4 different nodes picked up from DNS seed list of different frequencies starting from 
the highest 0.0079 as shown in Table 4-1. The results show that given only one node of 
our choice, we are mostly not lagging the web wallet server in terms of synchronization. 
The average latency in the table is a relative value by local time stamp minus the time 
Table 4-5 Average Latency 1 
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stamp on the server. Only Node 2 here shows a tiny average delay of 1.46s and the other 
negative values tell us that we were receiving transactions faster.  
The result goes against our initial assumption and proves that single connectivity to 
specific node still guarantees a functional information source. However, Table 4-5 does 
not explain why latency differences between the four tested nodes occur in such a way. 
Nodes 1 to 4 are ranked with decreasing order of frequency and we hope to see higher 
frequency node is more active than others.   
To further investigate such property, we moved on to the second time evaluation 
based on the seed node list pattern shown in Figure 4-2. We picked 6 nodes in decreasing 
frequency and made the following statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-6 shows a much clearer pattern what performance each tested node has in 
relaying transactions.  Nodes 1-3 are the three most active nodes from the seed list at the 
moment and they all proved to provide us in-time information delivery somewhat better 
than the blockchain.info server, with Node 3 as the most active one that leads an average 
of more than 5 minutes. 
Test Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Total # 
Transaction
s Collected 
4626 4852 4051 4077 1615 6021 
Frequency 
in DNS Seed 
List 
0.0062 
0.005
7 
0.005
5 
0.000
3 
0.000
1 
5.4e-6 
Average 
Latency 
with Server 
-10s -1.13s -323s 2.25s -4s 650s 
Table 4-6 Average Latency 2 
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Figure 4-4 Tx Arrival Latency for Node 3 
 
Transaction relaying process on Node 3 is elaborated in Figure 4-4 which shows each 
transaction arrival status in time order. For transactions arriving to our client later than 
the blockchain.info server, the relative latency is no longer than 140s that is within 3 
minutes. There are many more transactions we received ahead of time for more than a few 
thousand seconds some of which are several hours. These facts give us sense that Node 3 
is a pretty active Bitcoin node and has very nice performance of data relay.  
Node 6 works in contrary to Node 3 case. Since we are lagging for more than 10 
minutes in average transaction arrival time, we consider this node as much less active as 
Nodes 1 to 3.  
 
Figure 4-5 Tx Arrival Latency for Node 6 
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Figure 4-5 shows detailed transaction arrival pattern tested on Node 6. Anomaly 
exists in Table 4-5. Node 5 only relayed 1615 transactions far below the average number 
during the same length of time over the network. This reveals that connection to Node 5 
was interrupted during the experimental process.  
Not all nodes given by DNS seeds are guaranteed active all the time such as Node 5 
here. Our observation shows high frequency nodes in the DNS seed feedback tend to be 
more active and stable with better efficiency of information propagation. 
2) Experiment 4 – Transaction Loop Back 
Experiment 3 evaluates efficiency on different sample nodes provided as seed nodes. 
Experiment 4 attempts to find out how a typical Bitcoin transaction travels around 
different paths on real network. But Bitcoin transactions are never recorded with source 
or relay paths, capturing how a transaction was routed is difficult. Experiment 4 does the 
following tests trying to detect difference nodes inside the seed list and others. 
We launched two processes of Bitcoin clients on the same host; say Client 1 and 
Client 2. We connected Client 1 to only one peer node to Test Node 1 mentioned in 
Experiment 3; and Client 2 only to Test Node 2. Then we sent multiple Bitcoin payments at 
Client 1. Since both test nodes are found to be highly active from previous experiments, we 
assume transaction propagation between them is within very little number of hops. We 
kept track of the time interval from sending transaction from Client 1 to receiving it at 
Client 2. In this way the transaction goes back in a loop to the same destination as origin.  
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Test Case Seed Node to Seed Node 
# Transactions 100 
Average Intervals 7.07s 
T 
 
Figure 4-6 Per-transaction Loop-around Time 
Figure 4-6 shows all the 100 transactions loop-around time and in average we need to 
wait 7.07 seconds for a transaction we signed to come back. This also approximates the 
time it takes from Test Node 1 to 2. 
For a second trial in Experiment 4, we replaced the two test nodes with nodes outside 
the DNS seed list at the moment. 
The two nodes are chosen among peers that were previously used in the program 
history. Initial expectation is that we want to get somewhat longer average loop-around 
delay due to less activity of these nodes compared to those shown in Table 4-7. 
 
Test Case Nodes Outside Seed List 
# Transactions 76 
Average Intervals 6.28s 
 
Table 4-7 Loop-around Time 1 
 
Table 4-8 Loop-around Time 2 
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Figure 4-7 Per-transaction Loop-around Time 2 
 
The outcome from Table 4-8 did not comply well with our expectation and the pattern 
in Figure 4-7 did not exhibit essential difference from Figure 4-6. The average loop-around 
interval is roughly the same with 7.07s in the first trial case. 
The major reason of deviation from expectation comes from two restrictions. First, 
only a low number of actual transactions were issued so the average interval was still not 
of adequate statistical significance. Second, the nodes of choice are still of nice relaying 
performance because they were picked from the program history of nodes that had been 
used before.  
 
3) Experiment 5 – Transaction Fee Distribution 
Experiment 5 does in-depth study on the transaction fees over Bitcoin system within 
the recent two years. The study covers block 200,000 to block 305,000 corresponding to 
time starting from 10:45:59, 09-22-2012 to 21:58:26, 2014-06-09. There are more than 
33,000,000 transactions during this time period and this experiment uniformly picked 
10,944,186 out of those as samples to analyze how much transaction fee is included in 
each of them. Also we care about whether there is a steady trend in Bitcoin users’ 
preference of paying transaction fees. For example, we hope to find conclusion if most 
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Bitcoin users are used to paying a fixed amount of transaction all the time or instead this 
amount gets changed by time. Also we hope to know if there have been more people 
willing to reward miners fee or not since Sept 2012. 
The Bitcoin client is implemented with an important rule on transaction fee, called 
“minimum transaction fee”. This rule has significant impact on the economy of Bitcoin 
circulation. The “minimum transaction fee” is the minimum amount that is imposed on 
every Bitcoin transaction unless the transaction is 0. Any transaction fee below this 
amount will be treated the same as 0 in the transaction relay process. 
Bitcoin client does not always forward transactions of 0 transaction fee unless a 
transaction satisfies a priority threshold. The priority [21] of a transaction is calculated 
over a transaction’s input age, payment amount and its data size in bytes. There is no way 
to forge transactions with high priority so that no attacker is able to send large traffic of 
free payments to lay down other Bitcoin nodes, which is called “penny flood”. Transaction 
fee is calculated in the base unit in Bitcoin named “satoshi” after the pseudonym of the 
initial whitepaper. One Bitcoin (BTC) is equivalent to 108 satoshi and current “minimum 
transaction fee” is set at 10000 satoshi. Right now Bitcoin client automatic appends a 
minimum transaction fee on every payment the user sends in order for transactions to be 
smoothly relayed.  
During the transaction analysis process, we excluded all generation transactions. 
Generation transactions are the first transaction in each block signed by miners as mining 
reward so it makes no sense to define transaction fee for generation transactions.  
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Figure 4-8 # Transactions with Transaction Fees 
 
A global statistics on the 100944186 collected transactions is displayed in Figure 4-8 
with logarithmic scale of transaction fees in satoshi on x axis and number of transactions 
with corresponding fee on y axis. The transaction fees range from a maximum value of 
980000000 (9.8 BTC) to 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Figure 4-9 Distinct Transaction Fee Sorte              Figure 4-10 Percentages of Transaction Fees Under 10000 
 
Due to a large sum of transactions, we rearranged all the transactions fees, collected a 
total of 22148 distinct fee amounts and sorted the sequence in ascending order. Figure 4-9 
illustrates the sorted results with y axis representing one unit of minimum transaction fee 
       44 
(104 satoshi) and x axis only as the index in the sorted list. A majority (about 13500 out of 
22148) of fee amounts are distributed under 30000 satoshi. 
From the arranged transaction fee data set, we are more concerned transactions with 
a fee less than 10000 satoshi which is below the minimum fee threshold. To make a better 
observation we split the data set in time order into 56 slices with each consisting of 
167,000 transactions that account for about half a month real time. Figure 4-10 displays in 
each column the proportion of transactions with miner fee below 10000 satoshi in each 
half a month period starting from Sept 22, 2012. The increasing trend verifies that current 
protocol of relaying transactions based on priority filtering is working. As coin age is 
determined by the age of block an input transaction is in, there will be more transactions 
with older inputs as time goes by because unspent transactions become “mature” as the 
block chain grows. 
 
4) Experiment 6 – Tx Fee vs. Tx Confirmation Time 
For end users, paying a transaction fee is for the sole purpose of having their 
payments confirmed in a shorter time. In Experiment 6 we investigate what role 
transaction fees are playing to improve end user experience. However it is not possible to 
calculate transaction confirmation time from the block chain data because there is no 
information what time a transaction was generated. There is a public stat chart available 
on blockchain.info website [22] showing long-term average confirmation time on a macro 
scale without any per transaction based information.  
In this experiment we compute the approximate transaction confirmation time by 
assuming that all transactions arrived at the blockchain.info server in a very short time. 
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The confirmation time is estimated as the interval from the arrival to its confirmation into 
a block, whereas confirmation time is guaranteed to be exact as all blocks have 
timestamps. Experiment 3 showed that it is not a true case for all transactions as some of 
them would take hours to arrive at the server. This would cause the estimated guaranteed 
confirmation time to be negative in extreme cases.  
We sampled 56,000 transactions from block 200,000 to block 305,000 and used 
blockchain.info database as reference. Although larger amount of attempt can improve 
data precision we limited the sample size at 56,000 to avoid abusing API provided by 
blockchain.info. 
 
Figure 4-11 is the global statistics on the 56,000 transactions with y axis in every 
10000 satoshi as unit.  We filtered out all negative confirmation times that are trivial. 
There is no clear pattern to extract from the diagram and transaction confirmation time 
vs. transaction fees are not going in a monotonic way. Figure 4-12 is ascending order 
arrangement of transaction fees from Figure 4-11 to make x axis more compact. 
Figure 4-11 Confirm. Time vs. Transaction Fee 
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Figure 4-12 Confirm. Time Arranged by Increasing Fee 
 
By results from Figure 4-9 a majority of transactions are ranged above and round 
10000 satoshi. So if we try to detail part of the data set of Figure 6-1, we have the 
following table.  
Fees in 
satoshi 
10000 10001 10004 10009 10010 
Confir
m 
Time 
(s) 
1083 723 205 457 241 
 10019 10021 10022 10055 20000 
 900 446 90 4290 667 
 
Table 4-9 is the average estimated confirmation time for transactions starting from 
the minimum amount to twice the amount, as a local view into Figure 4-9. The table shows 
the effectiveness of raising transaction fee to amounts higher than the minimum value. 
However, higher transaction fees do not always reward with sooner confirmation. It is not 
correct to say paying a large sum fee to the miner guarantees privilege than others even 
when error in the sampling space is considered. We would suggest an end user pay a 
default amount of minimum transaction fee in everyday use of Bitcoin as the minimum 
amount suffice to make confirmation within acceptable time in most cases. 
Table 4-9 Confirm. Time for Tx above Fee 10000 
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In this experiment we would like to go one step further to magnify the significance of 
“minimum transaction fee”. We collected all the transactions with exactly 10000 satoshi 
fee, the default value by the standard client and most web wallets.  
 
Figure 4-13 Avg. Confirm. Time for Fee 10000 
Figure 4-13 lists out all transactions with the default 10000 satoshi fee by time order 
still with all negative estimation values filtered out. Out of fluctuation the confirmation 
times do not show any monotonic pattern. This means that for end users, their waiting 
time for transaction confirmation has not changed much at this moment compared to Sept 
2012. This verifies our above suggestion. 
 
4.4 Summary on experiments 
This chapter presented two sets of altogether 6 experiments to reveal some 
parameters that affect end user experience from network environment investigation and 
transaction synchronization evaluation. We conclude from experiments in Set A to the 
proposition that DNS seeds tend to choose more active Bitcoin nodes and those of the 
highest frequency tend to stay on top of the address list during some fixed time. The way 
that DNS seed servers organize IP addresses can affect the network’s topology in which 
some group of nodes get far more inbound connections than others. Despite the existence 
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of nodes that seem more essential than others address list on DNS seed servers are altered 
a lot by time. Given such servers are not manipulated by malicious colluding mining pools, 
the effect of DNS seeds can be consider positive to Bitcoin network because it improves 
the efficiency of node discovery for end users. 
Experiment set 2 is mostly focused on the way transactions get relayed. Via study 
over recent blocks within two years, we found that there has not been much change to 
Bitcoin user habit in terms of transaction fee amount. We suggest that all Bitcoin users 
attach a minimum of 10000 satoshi fee in their payment as refusing the minimum amount 
can significantly increase their waiting time for confirmation. But it is not worthwhile to 
pay too much more “tip” to miners because experiment results show that it does not 
necessarily pay off. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       49 
CHAPTER 5 
LARGE GRAPH BASED FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF BTC TRANSACTIONS 
In this chapter, about two years of Bitcoin transaction data is collected. We develop a 
graph-based method to analyze the money flow and identity clustering properties of these 
transactions. The approach is scalable for processing large Bitcoin graphs and focuses on 
transactions relevant to criminal cases such as Mt Gox. We seek for answers to forensic 
questions regarding specified time interval and/or a selected set of user identities. Some 
interesting results include the answer whether Bitcoin system achieves true anonymity, 
how money flows among selected users and community structures of Bitcoin users. The 
developed graph-based forensic investigation approaches are expected to help law 
enforcement in their investigations that deal with Bitcoin transactions. 
As stated in Chapter 1, Bitcoin as digital currency logically exists in different forms than 
paper money or balance from online banking. No user balance is recorded on the block chain. 
Every transaction is a record on a sum of money paid from one source to a destination. 
Bitcoin is identified and authenticated based on Bitcoin addresses, which are hashes 
generated from users’ public/private key pairs [23] and cannot be manipulated unless one 
possesses the correct private key. A Bitcoin address can be randomly generated based on a 
randomly picked key and is the only unique way of identification in the system. Due to the 
random property of Bitcoin addresses and extremely low probability of key collision due to 
the enormous ECDSA key space [24], the number of Bitcoin addresses grows rapidly 
because one may generate hundreds of different addresses for different transactions 
without address reusing. This address generation scheme results in pretty decent 
anonymity to Bitcoin transactions and makes it difficult to track Bitcoin transactions 
relating to real world entities in such an almost perfect anonymous system. 
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This chapter focuses on the transaction aspect of the Bitcoin system in an attempt to 
construct a low-cost transaction data analysis model, and atop it, develops analytical 
approaches to support forensic investigation of bitcoin transactions and relationship of 
bitcoin users. It reveals that different Bitcoin addresses belonging to the same entity can be 
effectively clustered to reduce the forensic efforts in tracking criminal bitcoin users, and 
graph analysis on bitcoin transactions help discover transaction behaviors and money flows 
among bitcoin users. It will show data analysis results in study about Mt Gox case. It is 
expected that this work will provide an easy and fast approach in the investigation of 
various criminal cases that involve the use of Bitcoins, such as money laundry or fraudulent 
transactions.  
5.1 Transaction data collection and the platform 
All transaction data used in this paper are confirmed Bitcoin transactions. We 
collected them from the block chain maintained in Bitcoin system, starting from block 
210,000 to block 314,700 corresponding to the block creation time from 15:24:38, 2012-
11-28 to 10:45:14, 2014-08-09. During this 20-month time period, a total number of 
34,839,029 Bitcoin transactions have been successfully released and globally confirmed. 
In these transactions, a total 35,770,360 distinct Bitcoin addresses were involved. All the 
results from this paper are based upon the transactions and addresses from this data set. 
Analytical study in this chapter is based on the block chain data downloaded using the 
compiled full Bitcoin client source Bitcoind in C++ [25]. This data set involved genuine 
with its integrity ensured through the crypto schemes used in Bitcoin system. Transaction 
and block data were queried with getrawtransaction and getblock command line RPC tool 
provided by Bitcoind itself. Alternatively it can be retrieved by directly revoking the 
getrawtransaction and getblock methods from the source. Both methods are globally 
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visible in file rpcrawtransaction.cpp and rpcblockchain.cpp. JSON format of single 
transactions were parsed from the above methods and written into the file as shown in 
Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2. 
 
Figure 5-1 One Single Transaction  
 
Figure 5-2 One Coinbase Transaction 
 
Major content in Bitcoin transactions is displayed in JSON notation in Figure 5-1. Figure 
5-2 is an example of Bitcoin generation in which there is no incoming address. It indicates 
creation of a new block with the hash value shown. For this example, 25.0512 BTC (as 1 coin 
unit) was mined and it belongs to the output address in the output array. This single 
transaction is also stored in the block with the hash value shown.  
{ 
"inputs":  
[ 
{"value": 2.5, "address": "13vjvKHDeFhtwRGseVkLF1eXA7ZrJA2Uo9"},  
{"value": 0.0092427, "address": "1EyH7htSWjSyuXgofuE9gKX5Sr4yEyDcD2"} 
],  
"blocktime": 1389490523,  
"outputs":  
[ 
{"value": 2.5, "address": "1Q5ztGyLj7KxL2rs7bmVcKYDfTYmpQs5bo"},  
{"value": 0.0090427, "address": "1G7HKqqTUCrTpMDEYV5SdzcarFPhKKHb12"} 
] 
} 
{ 
"inputs":  
[{"address": "coinbase"}],  
"blocktime": 1354133545,  
"blockhash": "0000000000000498e426effa08fc54070cd7ca70e80206f8763e7ceaaab734bc",  
"outputs": [{"value": 25.0512, "address":"1811f7UUQAkAejj11dU5cVtKUSTfoSVzdm"}] 
} 
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5.2 Graph-based Bitcoin transaction analysis 
The transaction investigation model consists of three major procedures. In the first step 
we collected transaction data set and parsed them into transaction input-output based 
format as shown in Figure 5-1. Based on the each transaction, we attempt to classify all 
addresses involved in the data set into groups in which we are confident enough to 
determine that these addresses belong to the same Bitcoin entity. Such an entity can be the 
same person, groups of Bitcoin users that share Bitcoin wallets (private keys) or colluding 
Bitcoin miners that cooperate in mining activities. 
The second step is to convert the transaction data into address based graph notation. 
The objective is that the transaction flow is clearly displayed between groups of addresses 
with each group representing addresses belonging to the same entity. We designed the 
graph in such a pattern that each node in the graph stand for the same group of addresses. 
Any transaction spent from addresses in the group is notated as an outward edge and any 
transaction paid to a group is the incoming edge to this group node.  
The last step seeks for answers to several questions. How efficient we are able to track 
currency flow with the help of address graph from the second step? How does graph 
behavior help us discover transaction activities like money laundry and large-scale Bitcoin 
theft/fraud? How do we investigate Bitcoin entities engaged in conspiracy if those activities 
exist in the transaction data record? The rest of this section covers all detailed algorithm 
and experiment processes regarding the problems. 
5.2.1 Address Clustering 
We attempt to adopt a fast algorithm of checking and grouping all the addresses into 
distinct sets as precise as possible so that we know what entity group an address belongs 
to given an arbitrary Bitcoin address. There exists previous work [26] that characterizes 
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Bitcoin transactions into different usage categories. During the work it was proposed as a 
heuristic that different Bitcoin addresses of inputs from the same transaction are 
guaranteed to be possessed by the same entity. The reason is that due to the nature of 
Bitcoin transaction signature scheme, one cannot spend transactions that are not paid to 
him. Therefore multiple input addresses in the same transaction are strong indication that 
whoever issued this transaction actually owns, or at least share private keys to all these 
addresses. 
In case of coin base transactions in Section II there is only one output address in the 
transaction output (Fig. 2.3) so this address alone get all the mining reward. But multiple 
addresses are also allowed in Bitcoin transactions including coin base transactions. Bitcoin 
mining intrinsically supports collaboration so that mining pools formed by multiple nodes 
participate intensive mining effort and addresses in the pool simply share the reward. For 
these reasons, the output addresses in the same coin base transaction are always pool 
related. We tell from coin bases the message of cooperation. For purpose of the problem 
definition in this paper, we also treat addresses cooperative in the same mining pool as an 
atomic entity for more clear reference. 
Another hint for address grouping is support for change described in Fig. 2.1 where a 
payer sends the change amount to his own address which we call change address in this 
paper. Generally the change address is a one-time generated address for the sole purpose 
of receiving one’s own money according to implementation by the current standard Bitcoin 
client software [27] the Bitcoin-Qt. By this property, we can be a bit aggressive to assume 
there are many one-time change addresses. One necessary condition for an output address 
to be classified as a change address is that it is not used as output one more time in the data 
set. Along with some other conditions summarized by previous work [28] we are able to 
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collect change addresses with low false positives. To summarize, addresses with the 
following patterns are classified to the same set. 
1. All input addresses in the same transaction must be in the same set. 
2. All output addresses in the same coin base transaction must be in the same set. 
3. An output address that is only used as output for once is classified to the same set of its 
transaction’s input addresses if the following conditions are met. 
- This output address is not the only address in this very transaction’s output. (A payment 
is not valid if it only sends the change.) 
- This output address does not exist in this very transaction’s input list. (It is to avoid self-
loop change though it is a rare case.) 
- None of the rest of output addresses in this very transaction’s output list is used as output 
for only once. (While a change address probably exists in this case, we are unable to tell 
which one in the output list is used for change). 
 
The actual classification takes effort in identifying and rearranging nearly 36 million 
addresses with each being a discrete and distinct string in 26-34 bytes length [29]. The 
problem is about iterating all the addresses in each transaction and writing them into 
proper sets so that addresses always belong to the same entity if they are in the same set. 
Moreover, this process involves set union operations because every time an address set that 
intersects with two or more existing sets, we have to union all those sets into an atomic new 
set. The process comes to a worst O(N2) address access time complexity and unacceptably 
intensive redundant memory consumption if we directly apply with hash tables. Instead of 
the above intuitive process we adopted a much more efficient algorithm to perfectly reach 
the same grouping objective described above. 
We used an open-source database developed by Google [30] as a light weighted on-
disk key-value mapping tool called LevelDB. LevelDB is a formal database toolset featured 
       55 
in the standard Bitcoin client Bitcoin-Qt for quick queries into the huge block chain data on 
disk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3 illustrates intuition of clustering different address sets. Every time we have 
a new address we map it to a new node. Suppose we have the following transaction input 
lists. 
 
Transaction ID Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 
Input Addr. List Addr1 Addr2 Addr1,Addr2,Addr3 Addr4 Addr1,Addr4,Addr5 
Database Operation (Addr1,ID1) (Addr2,ID2) (Addr3, ID3)  
(ID1, ID3)  
(ID2, ID3) 
(Addr4, ID4) (Addr5, ID5) 
(ID4, ID5) 
(ID3, ID5) 
We start from Tx1 with only 1 transaction input address. Mapping Tx1 and Tx2 is 
straightforward as Addr1 and Addr2 are from different transactions. However, Tx3 
intersects with both Tx1 and Tx2 so it tells the fact that Addr1, Addr2 and Addr3 are in the 
same set. Instead of modifying the Addr1 and Addr2, we simply search for the node ID they 
are mapped to. Then we map all the nodes we found to the node new with ID3. In this way, 
we join all the sets without sequential accessing addresses in each set. 
For Tx4 with no intersection with any other address sets in our current record, we 
simply map it to a new ID4. Similarly Tx5 intersects with several previous addresses so we 
update the database with operation shown in Table 5-1. After iterating from Tx1 to Tx5, all 
the 5 addresses are finally mapped to ID5. In this approach, given any sets of addresses we 
are able to correctly union all those with intersection, regardless of the order of iteration. 
(For instance, Tx5 to Tx1.) 
Addr1 
Addr2 
Addr3 
ID1 
ID2 
ID3 
Addr4 ID4 
Addr5 
ID5 
Figure 5-3 Conceptual Graph of Address Grouping  
Table 5-1 Operation on Sample Transaction Inputs  
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However, in case of our 36 million addresses the above algorithm is still far from 
efficient as the directed path in the Figure 5-3 tree structure can be long enough as to make 
a single address search at expense of traversing through thousands of node IDs. We improve 
the algorithm by simply remapping a graph node to the root every time we need to traverse 
a path. 
 
Transaction ID Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 
Input Addr. List Addr1 Addr2 Addr1,Addr2,Addr3 Addr4 Addr1,Addr4,Addr5 
Database Operation (Addr1,ID1) (Addr2,ID2) (Addr3, ID3)  
(ID1, ID3)  
(ID2, ID3) 
(Addr4, ID4) (Addr5, ID5) 
(ID4, ID5) 
(Addr1, ID3) 
(ID3, ID5) 
Table 5-2 shows improvement in operation at Tx5. As Tx5 has Addr1 for which we 
need to search from Addr1 to ID3 to get its root node ID. Once we find that Addr1 is actually 
mapped to ID3 we update this information for future reference. Similar shortcuts can also 
be applied to intermediate nodes such as ID2, if traversal through ID2 is needed at any later 
point. To summarize the algorithm, we do the following. 
1. Grab the next Bitcoin transaction and extract its input addresses (or outputs in case 
of coinbase) 
2. Examine the extracted address set. For addresses not yet in the database, we map all 
them onto a new ID.  Ignore all existing addresses but traverse to the root node ID that 
address points to and memorized it in a set. During each traverse, optimize a path with 
shortcut if possible. 
3. Examine the root node ID set in step 2. If the set is empty we have finished the work. 
Otherwise map the root node IDs in the set onto the new node ID in step 2. In case no new 
addresses are found in step 2, create a new node and do the same. 
4. Go on and grab the next Bitcoin transaction. Repeat 1-3. 
The above steps accomplishes set mapping among transaction input addresses and 
coinbase output addresses. We need one last step to scan for one-time change addresses by 
Table 5-2 Improved Operation on Sample Transaction Inputs  
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applying rules mentioned above. We conclude the address set classification to the following 
outcomes. 
 Among all the 35,770,360 addresses we processed, 35,587,286 addresses are 
used as outputs. We identified 398,954 one-time change addresses that qualified 
our heuristic.  
 A total number of 13,062,822 distinct address sets were generated. 
5.2.2 Address graph observations 
Up till this point, we have sufficient knowledge of what unique set a Bitcoin address 
belongs to. We are now ready to interpret raw Bitcoin transactions into a currency flow 
model between Bitcoin address sets. Our objective is to sketch a graph that reflects 
monetary relationship between sets of addresses so that tracing the incoming and 
outgoing payments about specific Bitcoin entity is possible. We define our directed graph 
as follows. 
1. Each vertex in our graph stands for a set of address, which represents a discrete 
Bitcoin entity that possibly possesses multiple addresses. 
2. Each edge is a payment of specific Bitcoin. An outgoing edge from a vertex is 
payment from the current address set the vertex stands for to another set. Similarly an 
incoming edge is payment received by this address set. Each edge in our directed graph is 
weighted with amount of payment.  
Furthermore, we expect to study the transaction behavior within fixed time intervals 
so we divided Bitcoin transaction data from block #210,000 to block #314700 into 
multiple discrete samples with each consisting of 20 subsequent blocks, so that we have a 
total of 5236 graph data files. Each graph data file was converted into a graph defined 
above. We came to the following observations by quantitatively analyzing each graph. 
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Figure 5-4 is a count of nodes with all numbers of incoming edges, calculated over all 
the 5236 graphs. A majority of nodes are with less than 100 incoming edges as shown by 
the logarithmic y-axis. Figure 5-5 is a count of nodes with all numbers of outgoing edges, 
calculated over all the 5236 graphs. It has similar distribution with the incoming edges 
shown in Figure 5-4 still with y-axis as logarithmic scale counting the number of nodes with 
specific number of degree. Other than the degree counts, we found that among the 
94880896 edges over all of the graphs, 89406338 are payments below 10 BTC, accounting 
for a 94.2% proportion.  
5.2.3 Money flow analysis and algorithm 
As we concentrate on the graph edges, the major problem we consider is what 
happened to a specific sum of money. Whenever theft or fraud occurs, the coin goes two 
ways. First they are actually spent which is equivalent to being split and sent to multiple 
other entities. Second the stolen coin can be sent to multiple addresses through different 
transactions before they are finally collected to a criminal’s Bitcoin wallet. This process is 
in some sense similar to money laundry if such a pattern exists in our graph. To 
quantitatively capture the money flow we decide to breadth-first search to determine the 
most probable direction the stolen coins goes in.  
Figure 5-4  In-degree Distribution Figure 5-5  Out-degree Distribution 
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Our algorithm starts with a set of nodes from the graph within fixed time periods. With 
these nodes as the starting level, we BFS search the graph and memorize the nodes’ number 
and total net output at each level until there is no more new node to find.  
 
 
The output of this algorithm is a list of node counts and a list of net coin output at each 
BFS level. We define the net coin output by calculating difference between total value of 
output edges and incoming edges. 
We forward track the Bitcoin so that given a set of starting nodes we search for the 
pattern of coin transfer to elsewhere in split sums or go through money laundry process. 
Due to potential incompleteness of our address classification database, money laundry can 
also show up as a large amount of coins ending up at different graph nodes than the start. 
In this case we expect two graph patterns: 
1. Starting nodes are involved in cycles consisting of large edges directed to them, with 
approximately the same total values as the total values of outgoing edges from them. 
2. No valid graph cycles are found but coins converge into smaller number of large 
value edges that are gathered by a set of other nodes. 
BFS_Graph(G): 
Initialize curLevel={set of starting nodes}, nextLevel=new set() 
Initialize countList=new list[], netOutputList=new list[] 
 while curLevel is not empty: 
  add #node in curLevel into countList 
  for each node in curLevel: 
   add all unvisited neighbors of the node to nextLevel 
   mark neighbors as visited 
   netOutput= netOutput +sum(out edges)-sum(in edges) 
  add netOutput into netOutputList 
 curLevel=nextLevel 
 nextLevel=new set() 
BFS algorithm on address graphs for money flow 
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5.2.4 Case study: Mt Gox case 
We have built a concrete data model that describes detailed Bitcoin flow pattern. We 
now come to reach our objective to find specific patterns that help with forensic 
investigation. We concentrate our application on a case study about the Mt. Gox incident. 
Mt. Gox used to be the largest Bitcoin exchanger and web wallet service provider in 
the world. On February 7, 2014 Mt. Gox announced technical difficulty blamed for hacking 
attacks followed by a press release on February 10, 2014 claiming to have lost a total 
amount of more than 850,000 BTC worth a half billion dollar according to the market price 
of Bitcoin at the moment. The Mt. Gox incident, which leads to its official filing for 
bankruptcy, has been undergoing investigation for months and no clear explanation has 
been given. There is study about the Bitcoin transaction malleability [31] that was once 
believed to lead the huge loss from Mt. Gox. In their analysis, malleability attacks did exist 
to falsely modify transactions to enable twice amount of currency withdrawal from Mt. 
Gox. However, only a very small fraction of the alleged 850,000 Bitcoin could be tracked 
from their malleability detection data. It is still not clear how the rest of the coins were 
lost. According to a police investigation report [32] there were signs that the company’s 
offices had been physically infiltrated and at least one former employee pilfered electronic 
data.  
For whatever reason it was, Mt.Gox sustained huge loss of coins from the incident, 
which we believe must have been reflected on the block chain data and is also in our graph 
data. With high probability, the theft involves large sums of currency flows during short 
time, which we expect to find from our graphs. By observation described above, we have 
94.2% of edges in our graph below 10BTC. To reduce the dataset for computing feasibility, 
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we pruned all our graph files of edges of small values and kept edges of 10 BTC and above 
only. This simplifies the graph sets and brings efficiency to discover large flows. 
Based on the Mt. Gox incident timeline, technical difficult was experienced and 
withdrawal service was suspended on February 7. As no theft case regarding the incident 
could have occurred after withdrawal stopped, we restrict our time window within a few 
days earlier before that. We started at graphs edges with timestamps at 19:49:42, 2014-
02-03 till the time ending at 08:36:47, 2014-02-07. 
We first extracted all graph nodes and edges within the specific time frame and 
integrated them into a new graph that describes global transaction patterns during the 
incident. 
 
Figure 5-6 Sum of Transaction Amount by Time 
 
Figure 5-6 is a time based sum-of-edge-value chart that displays the sum of values of 
all edges, equivalent to total transaction amount at each time stamp. Sum of edge values 
helps us know what time and in which groups of edges a burst of Bitcoin flow occurs. A 
burst of Bitcoin flow indicates large-scale currency transfer. During calculation of edge 
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sums, we remove any edge that starts and ends on the same node so that we make sure 
that the transfer is between different entities.  
The maximum peak of burst is shown in Figure 5-6 on x-axis value 359 to 363, 
corresponding to the UTC timestamp from 23:57:01, 2014-02-05 to 00:28:17, 2014-02-06. 
However, the total output values of these edges only account for about 100,000 BTC still 
far from being able to put Mt. Gox down to bankruptcy. Although we are not able to make 
perfect explanation for the claimed loss of 850,000 BTC from our dataset, we still 
reasonably found some behavior that is related to theft with high probability. There must 
be theft activities elsewhere but within the above time frame we believe it is the latest 
possible peak we are able to determine. As far as this case alone is concerned, it is 
acceptable to give about 1-day time before Mt. Gox eventually suspended cash withdrawal 
and made formal announcement.  
 
Figure 5-7 Suspicious Nodes with Largest Values 
 
We first picked up all nodes connected to edges that contribute to the peak discussed 
in Figure 5-6 and we identified 153 distinct nodes involved. Figure 5-7 displays sorted 
values of the 153 nodes we spotted during the sensitive time period. The y-axis value is 
the sum of values from all edges at that time. We focus on the last 14 nodes that received 
the highest payment in total. That is, the nodes with values higher than 4000 BTC. Starting 
with the 14 nodes, we adopted the BFS algorithm against global graph context after 
specified time point. At the starting level, we initialize our traversal list to contain the 
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above 14 nodes. This process was completed after 1461 levels before no more could be 
found. 
 
Figure 5-8 displays node counts during the BFS process. The node count drastically 
declines after the first 20 levels and finally converges to 1 single node. However, this figure 
is not telling enough information about the destination the transaction burst from 23:57:01, 
2014-02-05 to 00:28:17, 2014-02-06 was actually transferred to, because we need the coin 
output into consideration. The net output of nodes at each level is plotted as Figure 5-9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial 14 nodes transfer 70510 BTC to neighbors. We are searching for some level 
such that nodes all the 70510 BTC are spent. Negative output shown in Table 5-3 is 
indication that nodes in the current level receive more income from other sources. When 
the BFS comes to the level where 12 nodes has much larger output than all previous income, 
it reflects that the initial 70510 we are tracking is split into the following 32621 nodes. From 
the decreasing output pattern in Figure 5-9, we are not able to find enough evidence of 
money laundry for which we expect to see large sum of coins converge to a small set of node 
or go back to the starting nodes in a reasonable length of time period. 
# Nodes 12 14 17 12 32621 
Net Output 70510 -31205.998 -49545 2458376 3335101 
Figure 5-8 Node Count at Each BFS Level Figure 5-9 Values of All Nodes within Each Level 
Table 5-3 Initial Stages of BFS 
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5.3 Summary 
Findings from the experiments are concluded as follows. 
- Regarding the large coin transfer we focused on, there is no significant evidence 
showing money laundry activities for which we expect either edge-convergent pattern 
or graph cycles consisting of edges of equivalent values. 
- The experiment results show high probability that a great portion of suspected 
Bitcoin has been spent and split by quite a few transactions paid to different entities 
instead of being kept to specific addresses of conspiracy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FURTHER DISCUSSION 
 
Experiments illustrated in Chapter IV hopefully not only reveal current user end 
environment parameters but also provide some insights into how Bitcoin system as a 
large P2P network can be partially modeled from a local scope with limited resource so 
that similar methodology possibly gets adapted to designing more sophisticated empirical 
approaches for future study. Other than the major discovery that the Bitcoin network 
resource is shared with different weights among all nodes and specific groups of nodes 
have higher priority of receiving messages and having transactions confirmed, we also 
found that transaction fee is not a significant indication on suspicious activities. Because 
higher transaction fee does not statistically guarantee a faster confirmation, it does not 
offer much help in real forensic investigation.  
Approaches suggested in Chapter V have two major restrictions. First, address 
classification is transitive so that future transactions potentially affect the group database 
by having multiple intersections with existing address sets. The latest block transaction 
data available in our data set is 347,000 but we expect that future transactions can be 
stronger hints for existing address sets to be joined. Moreover, we encourage application of 
anti-anonymity approaches above our classification method because it can significantly 
reduce the number of sets, which we conclude to 13,062,822. 
The second major restriction lies in our address graph experiment. As the dataset did 
not cover the complete block chain data, this experiment was not able to determine the 
exact amount of coin value a specific vertex in the graph holds at each time stamp. By 
tracing the relative in-flow and out-flow of currency, our BFS outcome only reveals the 
flow of suspected currency without listing an accurate list of addresses of conspiracy. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Two major contributions are expected from this thesis. The first contribution lies in 
detailed practical study on information propagation in the Bitcoin network. Experimental 
verification is set up and discussed step by step to reveal specific facts regarding certain 
network environment parameters that impact message relay, node discovery and 
transaction confirmation. Although restrictions may apply to the experimental outcomes 
considering the P2P nature of Bitcoin with lots of probabilistic variants subject to network 
topology and long term time scale. But some results are acquired that can differ from the 
theoretical Bitcoin network model which is based on ideal multicasting mechanism and 
much simplified transaction verification schemes than what is currently programmed in 
standard Bitcoin applications. 
The second contribution refers to the forensic investigation about Bitcoin transaction 
records. The investigation is based on experiments of classifying Bitcoin addresses and 
reorganizing data structures of the block chain so that different Bitcoin user entities can to 
some extent be revealed. This brings one step closer to forensic demands to track where 
large sums of currency flow to during specific time frame. On top of the classification 
model, graph based approach is applied to a case study on the recent Mt. Gox incident, a 
large Bitcoin theft case leading to bankruptcy of the once biggest Bitcoin market 
exchanger in the world. 
Future work derived from this research include a sophisticated graph analysis 
through the whole block chain; an integration of anti-anonymity Bitcoin address 
identification database and consistent up-to-date copy of classified Bitcoin addresses; and 
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quantitative analysis how powerful Bitcoin mining tools can be in future to manipulate the 
growth of the block chain. 
Bitcoin is now generally considered as a promising decentralized global transaction 
system with open, public and scalable advantages. However, security concern has been a 
persisting topic since the genesis of Bitcoin. This thesis focuses its two study areas onto 
network topology and currency flow investigation. These aspects correspond to 
controversies whether Bitcoin will remain a well decentralized network because miners 
impose great significance on the system functionality; and whether it is possible to trace 
the destination of Bitcoin involved in large theft cases. Experiments in these researched 
hopeful help provide reference for future security related Bitcoin evaluations. 
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